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LOCAL AND TRANSITORY ACTIONS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
If the world were organized into one state and governed
by a uniform system of law, there would manifestly be no need
for international law, either public or private. The Roman
state, in so far as it attempted to establish a universal dominion,
did not recognize that any system of law other than the Roman
could control its obligations, or that of its citizens, to other
tates or the citizens of other states. But in the very process
of extending the sway of its empire to other peoples, it was dis-
covered that the extension of a uniform non-yielding system of
law presented difficulties quite commensurate with the extension
of a unique authority. Accordingly, in adapting the laws of
Rome to transactions with or between non-citizens, many of
whom were living under a state of society different from that
of Rome, a ju. gentium developed, somewhat paradoxically,
within the Roman state itself. In great measure it was devol-
oped from a conflict of laws and local customs without a conflict
of sovereignty.
The mediaeval period also witnessed the development of
sovereign states with a diversification of law not at all coexten-
sive with their state boundaries. This was due partly to the
common origin of the private law of Europe, partly to the
loosely organized character of the state itself. Legislative power,
especially in Italy and France, was local before it became central.
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The result was that conflicts of law and jurisdiction within the
state became frequent, and, as trade increased, inevitable. The
extra-jurisdictional recognition and enforcement of rights was
therefore rendered necessary by reason of the structure of the
state itself, not as in England, a new and unusual problem for
the judiciary to solve whenever the happening of an event in
issue made the application of English law inappropriate. Lain6
has said that at a period when the multiplicity of statutes or
customs was exciting conflicts of law in Europe, especially in
Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands, for the solution
of which an array of rules was growing up, called the theory of
the statutes, England, wherein the Anglo-Saxon customs were
becoming blended with the Norman, enjoyed a system of laws
almost unfform.1
As conflicts of law within England were prevented by the
paucity of foreign trade relations prior to'the period of-com-
mercial expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
the courts adopted an attitude of the most primitive, one would
almost be inclined to say savage, conservatism. Thus we read in
the Year Book, 2 Edward II, that a writ of debt was brought,
in 1308, upon a bond executed in Berwick, Scotland, and the
judges decided that "because it was made at Berwick where this
Court has not cognizance, it was awarded that John (the plain-
tiff) took nothing by his writ." 2
It would not be fair to say that as time went on, the local
limitation of jurisdiction in English courts resulted in the exclu-
sion of jurisdiction over foreign transactions, or the causes of
action arising out of them. We are warranted in asserting,
however, that the procedural rules allocating the trials of 'action
according to the place where the transactions took place, did
exercise an appreciable influence upon the recognition accorded
by the common law to rights arising in a foreign jurisdiction.
Even today, in this country at least, the law seems to be
in a transitory state, moving in the direction of progress, but
with old conceptions still intrenched.in many jurisdictions. We
'Journal de droit international priv , 1896 p. 484.
'Selden Society Publications, 1xo-x1.
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may, therefore, examine with profit a class of cases in which,
partly by judicial decision, partly by legislation, the progressive
tendency has become manifest.
We have seen that originally all actions in England were
considered local, The place therefore where the facts in issue
arose was required to be alleged and the venue of the action
corrctly laid accordingly. It is said that the rule arose out of
the early practice which required a case to be tried by the jury
of the vicinage, who were presumed to have knowledge of the
facts and of the parties.3 The English judicial system devel-
oped from one of local to one of central or royal administration,
with a reference of the dispute to local sworn men.4 By the
statute of 16 and 17 Charles II, cap. 8 (i677) it was provided
that "after verdict, judgment should not be stayed or reversed
for that there was no right venue, so as the cause were tried by
a jury of the proper county or place where the action was-laid."
The venue could thereafter be laid in any county in England
except where the plaintiff's case was conceived as having some
necessary connection with a particular locality. In the latter case
alone, the true venue had to be laid. The categories of local
and transitory actions were then adopted in order to distinguish
cases which were so intimately connected with a particular place
as to require the venue to be laid there, from cases which could
be tried in any county in England. But where the cause of
action did not arise in England at all, but in some foreign
country, no jury could be summoned from the foreign place..
Accordingly, the distinction between local and transitory actions
would not logically apply because it was developed to determine
venue within the realm and not to discover whether an English
court had cognizance. What was originally a rule to accomplish
a better administration of justice could only prevent the exercise
of any jurisdiction whatever in a case in which the nature of
the action was determined to be "local." Indeed something of
this problem was sensed by the judges even before the statute of
8 See Mitchell, J., in Little v. Chicago & St. Paul Ry. Co., 6s Mini.
48 Af836).'Jenks, A Short History of English Law (rg9z3), pp. 4S-49..
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Charles II; for in Elizabeth's time, when part of the facts to be
proved occurred out of the realn, judgment was not withheld
because the jury would be called upon to determine the foreign
as well as the local issue of fact, otherwise it should not be
tried at all.5 Later, when confronted with the rule in actions
where the subject-matter itself and not the mere proof was
bound up with a foreign jurisdiction, the decision was more
difficult; either the rule must fail or every court in England must
be deemed incompetent, to the discomfiture of suitors domiciled
in England. But the earliest decisions gave no consideration to
international intercourse and when injury to real property out
of England was concerned, the plaintiff was held "not relievable
in any ordinary court of law." ( Perhaps this was characteristic
of the judicature of the period, this forcing of external issues
into the internal moulds for which they were .not at all designed.
It is therefore not entirely a coincidence that the jurist who
sought to grapple with so many of the early technical rules of
the common law in order to fit them to the needs of an expand-
ing commerce should also have brought his influence to bear
against this one. Lord Mansfield went out of his way in Mostyn
v. Fabrigas,7 to refer to two earlier decisions (not directly
reported) wherein he had entertained jurisdiction of actions for
damages to real estate lying in Nova Scotia and Labrador re-
spectively, where no local courts had yet been instituted. The
plaintiff in the case before him was suing for assault and false
imprisonment, so his remarks were obiter, but he characterizes
the distinction between local and transitory actions at a fiction
invented simply for the mode of trial:
"to every other purpose, therefore, it shall be contradicted, but not
for the purpose of saying the case shall not be tried."8
But Lord Mansfield's opinion did not prevail and the old rule
was firmly established in Doulson v. Matthews,9 because, said
' See Dowdale's Case, Cokes Rep., Part VI, 47 b x (i6o6).
'Skinner v. East India Company, 6 Howell's State Trials, 710, 119
(166s).
f i Cowp. 16r (i774); s. c., i Smith's Leading Cas. .59r.
*Ibid., p. 6io, and see the historical note, i Smith's Leading Cas, p. 615.
*4 Term. W" 503 .(793).
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Mr. Justice Buller, it was "too late" to consider whether the
distinction were "wise, or politic."
The principle was fully considered by our own Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in an action brought against Thomas Jefferson
for a trespass alleged to have been committed in New Orleans
while he was President, and Lord Mansfield's brave but futile
effort is thus commented on:
"One of the greatest judges who ever saton ainy behch and who
has done more to remove those technical impediments which grew
out of a different state of society, and too long continued to obstruct
the course of substantial justice, was so struck with the weakness
of the distinction between taking jurisdiction in cases of contract
respecting lands, and torts committed on the same lands, that he
attempted to abolish it."10
But the principle of stare decisis was too well intrenched even in
the formative period of American jurisprudence. It has been
remarked as strange that the great Chief Justice should have
given more weight to the English decisions rendered after the
Revolution than to those of Lord Mansfield rendered before it.
In Little v. Chicago & St. Paul Railway Co.,"1 action was brought
to recover damages to real estate situated in Wisconsin, caused
by the negligent operation of the defendant's railroad. Mit-
chell, C. J., in writing the opinion said that until Doulson v. Mat-
thews, the law had not been fully settled in England. The court
refused to follow the rule because it was in no sense a rule of
property:
"If the Courts of England, generations ago, were at liberty to
invent a fiction in order to change the ancient rule that all actions-
were local, and then fix their own limitations to the application of
the fiction, we cannot see why courts of the present day should deem
themselves sl.vishly bound by those limitations."22
The English courts have not been moved by the considera-
tions set forth by the Minnesota court, although the Judicature
Act of 1873 abolished all local venues for the trial of actions.-
In British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique,13
the plaintiff sought damages because it had been ejected by -the
"Livingston v. Jefferson. x Brock. 2o3; s. c., Fed. Cas. 84ir (x8r).
" 65 Minn. 48, 33 L- R. A. 423 (x896).
Ibid., p. . "
(1892) 2 Q. B. 358; reversed in the House of Lords (z893), A. C. 6o2.
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defendant from certain lands and mines in South Africa. There
was a disputed claim of possession and the plaintiff besides dam-
ages and an injunction sought a declaration that it was the
lawful possessor'. On appeal, the plaintiff abandoned all claims
except for damages and the Court of Appeal ordered a trial
upon the ground that the Judicature Act had enabled the court
to take jurisdiction. The House of Lords, however, reversed
this ruling, holding that the effect of the Judicature Act was
procedural only, and could not give jurisdiction in a case where
it had been lacking prior to the statute.
We are therefore obliged to accept the distinction between
local and transitory actions as still in effect in England, as
indeed it is the preponderating rule also in the United States. 1
In Chief Justice Marshall's own state of Virginia, the rule
was abolished by statute as early as i8i9.'" It has also been*
abolished in Texas 16 and more recently also in New York.
1 7
Besides these statutory changes, the doctrine has been subjected
to important modifications and exceptions. Thus where an .act
is performed in o.ne state, causing injury to real property in
another state, the action may be brought in either jurisdiction."
Of course, the reason of the rule, if indeed it be a rule of reason,
is just as applicable in this class of cases as where the act occurred
in the foreign jurisdiction; for the court has no greater power
to put one or the other of the parties in actual possession of the
property where the act of injury was begun in the local juril-
diction than it would have where the act occurred at the -foreign
situs of the property.
SEllenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. 1o7 (1894); Du Breuil v.
Pennsylvania Co., 130 Ind. 131 (i89); Allin v. Connecticut River Luraber Co4
i5o Mass. 56o (i8go); Niles v. Howe, 57 Vt. 388 (i885).
i Rev. Code 1819, p. 450, Sec. 14. See opinion of Green, J., in Payne
v. Britton's Executors, 6 Rand. (Va.) zox (1828), where the extent of the
abolition of the distinction between local and transitory actions affected by
this act is discussed.
11 R. S. iz98, as interpreted by Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 627 (r88x).
"Code of Civil Procedure, as amended 1913, Sec. 982a.
'Rundle v. •Delaware & R. Canal, i Wall, Jr., 275; s. c., Fed. Cas.
12,139 (z849); Stillman v. White Rock Mfg. Co., 3 Wood & M. 538, Fed.
"Cas' 13,446 (1847); Ruckman v. Green, 9 Hun 225 (1876) ; Thayer v. Brooks,
T7 Ohio 489 (i848). In the Rundle case (supra), the court says: "The
difficulty is caused not by any principles of international law, but by the
common law which is the same in both states."
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A second exception permits the owner of land in a foreign
jurisdiction to sue in the local forum where the trespass has
materialized into an asportation of timber, or the conversion of
growing crops or soil taken from the land. 9 Here the plaintiff
is assumed to have waived the trespass, although, where the
entry has occurred under a claim of title, the same issues may
be involved. If the defendant, while wrongfully occupying the
land, should burn down the timber, he could not be foilowed
out of the jurisdiction, whereas if he cuts it down atid disposes
of it, he may.2
0
The statute in New York was passed as a result of the
decision in Brisbane v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.21  The de-
fendant had communicated a fire to growing timber upon plain-
tiff's land in New Jersey. The court recognized that the grava-
men of the action was negligence and that only money damages
were sought. Title was not involved and the defense did not
dispute it in any way. Though recognizing the technical char-
acter of the rule and the exceptions to which we have referred,
the court felt powerless to change it. Before the end of the
year, however, the legislature added a new section to the Code
making all actions to recover damages to foreign real estate, or
for breach of contracts or covenants thereto, cognizable when-
ever such an action could be maintained in relation to personal
property.2
2
1 Whidden v. Seelye, 40 Me. 247 (155); American Union Tel. Co. v.
Middleton, 8o N. Y. 408 (i88o); Tyson v. McGuineas, 25 Wis. 656 (1870);
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. io5 (1894); West v. McClure,
8S Miss. 296 (1904).
"GA further seemingly absurd result of the technical character of the
rule appears from Brereton v. Canadian P. R. Co., 29 Ont. Rep. 57 (1913).
Action was brought in Ontario for negligently setting fire to plaintiff's house
and furniture in Manitoba. The court held that so far as the house was
concerned, the action was local, though damage to the furniture gave rise
to a transitory action. But as the action was not severable, plaintiff was
obliged to abandon his claim for the damage to the house in order to
recover for the loss of the furniture.
205 N. Y. 431 (1913).
'2 N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 982a. The statute has been
held not to apply to injury done prior to its enactment. Jacobus v. Colgate,
217 N. Y. 235 (igi6) ; Per Cardozo, J. "It is not a sufficient answer to say
that the old rule was unjust and technical. We may concede that it was."
(P. 244.)
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The refusal to take jurisdiction because the trial may involite
an issue of title to foreign land seems inconsistent with the
jurisdiction long exercised in equity where there is no hesitation
in compelling a defendant to act or omit to act in respect of
foreign land, wherever a cause for the intervention of equity
is otherwise sustained. As Chief Justice Marshall said in Massie
v. Watts: 23 "the circumstances that a question of title may be
involved in the inquiry and may even constitute the essential
point on which the case depends, does "not seem sufficient to
arrest that jurisdiction." The equity rule in England has been
stated in terms quite as broad. 24  Why then should'a foreign
trespass be excluded from the jurisdiction of common law courts
where the plaintiff seeks only compensation for the injury in
money damages? It was indeed suggested by Lord Hersnhell
in the British. South Africa Co. case, that after a plaintiff who
has been expelled from his lands in a foreign jurisdiction has
obtained damages in an English court, he might thereafter pro-
ceed to repossess himself of his lands.25 In that event, however, he
would find himself in difficulties in either the local or the foreign
courts. But Lord Herschell further argues that perhaps the
lands may be in an unsettled count& "where, to use a familiar
expression, the 'only right is might."26 This were a hardship
indeed and yet his compassion for the defendant is not at all
aroused when, in the same. opinion, he is called upon to contem-
plate the situation in Nova Scotia and Labrador where, at the-
time of Lord Mansfield's decisions, there were no local courts.
If title had been involved, Lord Herschell thinks Lord Mansfield
would have refused jurisdiction. If we accept Lord Hersehell's
ruling, holwever, justice would never triumph. Her sword
would be sheathed in the civilized community by a technical rule.
"6 Cranch r48 (8io).
" "Archer v. Preston, Lord Arglasse v. Muschamp and Lord Kildare v.
Eustace clearly show that with regard to any contract made, or equity
between persons in this 'country, respecting lands in a foreign country, par-
ticularly in the British dominions, this court will hold the -same jurisdiction
as if they were situate in England." Sir R. P. Arden, M. R., in Lord
Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Vesey r;'o, 182 (1796).
( x893), A. C., at p. 625.
"Ibid., p. 626.
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and broken in the foreign country by the reign of might. Even
if the foreign country were civilized it would only be necessary
for the tort-feasor to escape the jurisdiction where the land is
situated and he would again be everywhere immune. The court
is confronted by a dilemma the two horns of which are to refuse
to redress a wrong otherwise irremediable, or redress it even
though the injured party may himself thereafter commit a second
wrong. The dilemma should easily be resolved in favor of
the second alternative. Story seems to have leaned to this view,
although, like Marshall and others, he felt precluded by "the
actual jurisprudence of England." In commenting upon the
cases cited in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, he mentions the rule of Lord
Mansfield as having been reversed, "however maintainable it
might be upon general principles of international lav, if suit
were for personal damages only." 27
We would seem to have here another instance of the sur-
vival of a rule of law long after the historical conditions which
gave rise to it had disappeared. In referring to the development
of the common law, a recent writer has said: "Designed origin-
ally to govern purely domestic or internal relations and trans-
actions, the rise of international commerce necessitated the
infusion of a system of private international law." 28 The sway
of English law, in both hemispheres is. for the most part over
communities without complete sovereignty and yet completely'
autonomous in respect of municipal law and jurisdiction." A
greater influence of international viewpoints in -the administra-
tion of private lav may confidently be anticipated for the future
because of the increasing mobility of population and intercourse
and also because of the multiplication of autonomous local juris-
diction, a tendency -which the present world outlook may still




"Conflict of Laws, See. $54.
W. W. fBillson, Equity in its Relation to Common Law (197), p. i9.
